



**PHIL 203**



**Distance Delivery**



**Critical  
Thinking**

## Natural Language

- **Skinner's theory**
- **Chomsky's theory**
  - **Poverty of stimulus**
  - **Language window**
  - **Pidgins and Creoles**
  - **"Homework, dog, chomp!, sorry"**
  - **"Colorless green ideas sleep furiously."**
- **Deep-structure**
- **Culturally varied surface structure**

## Prisoner's Dilemma

- Game theory
- Strategic games
- Making the rational play
- Original version of the prisoner's dilemma
- Playing against a random computer
- Playing against a rational opponent

## Prisoner's Dilemma

	You play Heart	You play club
Computer plays heart	You get 3	You get 5
Computer plays club	You get 0	You get 1

# Prisoner's Dilemma

- Let's play!
- My rational play
- Your rational play
- Club is dominant play
- The paradox
- Can we strike a deal?
- Let's play again

	You play Heart	You play club
Jeff plays heart	You get 3 Jeff gets 3	You get 5 Jeff gets 0
Jeff plays club	You get 0 Jeff gets 5	You get 1 Jeff gets 1

# Problem of Altruism

- Biological altruism
  - Vampire bats
  - Chimpanzees
- Evolutionary problem
- Group selection verses individual or gene selection
- Kin selection
- Empirical confirmation

## **Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma**

- **Bargains**
- **Bargaining to law and government**
  - **State of nature**
  - **Social contract**
- **Rules and sanctions**
- **Cultural rules and sanctions**
- **Innate rules and sanctions?**

## **Repeated Play Tournaments**

- **Robert Axelrod**
- **The tournament**
  - **Each against the others**
  - **200 plays**
  - **Total points**
- **The players**
- **The clear winner**

## **TIT-FOR-TAT**

- **Plays heart on first move**
- **Plays what opponent played on previous move**
- **Simplest program**
- **Can't "win" against any opponent**
- **Still accumulates most points and wins the tournament**

## **Tit-for-Tat's Virtues**

- **Friendly (cooperates first play)**
- **Refuses to be a sucker (retaliates for defections)**
- **Doesn't hold grudges (as soon as opponent begins to cooperate, returns to playing hearts)**
- **Easy for opponents to figure out**

## **The Evolution of Cooperation**

- **In iterated play contexts, rational move may be to play heart (tit-for-tat)**
- **Cooperation may evolve naturally**
- **Empirical support for this view**
- **Is this enough?**

## **Secular Natural Law**

- **Prisoner's dilemma's are not hopeless**
- **Rational to set up and enforce rules**
- **Cooperative behavior is rational in iterated prisoner's dilemmas**
- **Biological basis for altruistic behavior toward kin**
- **Biological basis for cooperative behavior in general?**

# Biologically Based Moral Realism

- Deep-structure to morality
  - Tit-for-tat
  - Constrained-maximization
  - Predisposition to cooperation
- Cultural dimension
  - Obvious cultural differences
  - What is fair, reasonable, cooperative
  - Who one owes this constraint to

**Judges as  
constrained  
maximizers**

**Same  
potential  
problem as  
with efficiency**

**Tort rules as  
attempts at  
cooperation**

*Secular Natural Law & Torts*

**Constrained  
maximization  
as Dworkin's  
value?**

**Corrective  
justice as a  
model for  
cooperation?**

**Explaining  
*Vincent v. Lake  
Erie  
Transportation***